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Noisetraders, Trade liberalization, 
Vertical relations
Since mid 2007 there has been a dramatic rise in prices for basic foods such as 
internationally traded varieties of rice, corn and wheat. At the moment, it is rather 
impossible to estimate how far speculation in the commodity markets has contributed 
to this development. Irrespective of this, a long-term solution to present and future 
supply shortfalls, including investment in more efficient agro-technologies and infra-
structures is required. This is a matter for the inter  national community which should 
continue to promote the abolition of international trade barriers in the agricultural 
sector in addition to local measures to provide structural aid. Hoped-for structural 
change may however be impeded if agricultural producers are exposed both to the 
market power of trader demand and the supplier power of upstream suppliers. It 
therefore appears that controls on abuse of market power at an international level 
are urgently required in order to increase the efficiency of agricultural markets and 
ultimately to secure the food supply.
The drastic price increase in agricultural products has brought hunger back onto 
the political agenda (Figure 1).1 The low income population is the very people who 
can no longer offset price rises by restructuring their expenditure. The FAO (Food 
and Agriculture Organization) estimates that currently around 862 million people 
worldwide receive inadequate nourishment. The hope that favorable economic 
development could vastly reduce hunger has now been dashed.2
If the present price increases were to represent a long-term trend, there would be 
a threat of acute hunger crises in the future. But even moderate price increases, 
attributable to a growing demand for higher-value agricultural products and bio-
fuels, can lead to continuing supply shortfalls in the long-term. The growing world 
population and rising living standards make an increase in agricultural production 
inevitable. This can be achieved both by rises in productivity and expansion in 
cultivable land.
Horizontal and ver  tical impediments to market liberalization frequently stand in 
the way of these objectives. A better understanding of transactions within the agri-
1   These developments provoked the fear of an international supply crisis which drove the people in countries such as 
the Ivory Coast, India, Mexico, Cameroon and Senegal onto the streets. The FAO gives a regular overview of the crisis 
countries. FAO: Crop Prospects and Food Situation. No. April 2008,2.
2   Cf. The Global Hunger Index Progress Indicator. This is publshed regularly by the International Food Policy Re-
search Institute (IFPRI).Causes and consequences of rising food prices
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cultural value chain is also necessary as increased 
prices often do not reach the small producers in 
developing countries.
Unequal partners in the global agricultural 
market
In developing countries great importance is often 
attached to agriculture. On the one hand the prices 
of agricultural products are kept artificially low by 
export duties and state marketing organizations to 
ensure that the domestic population is supplied with 
cheap food. On the other hand export products, the 
so-called “cash-crops“ such as cotton, peanuts, co-
coa or coffee are a welcome source of tax revenue. 
By contrast, in the industrial countries the impor-
tance of the agricultural sector continues to decline. 
The political aim of cushioning social hardship, of 
structural change, and the farmers’ high degree of 
political organization, has meant that agriculture in 
these countries has become a major net recipient 
of state subsidies. Some examples of this are the 
European sugar beet producers, American cotton 
farmers and Japanese rice farmers. For years they 
have all been profiting from the segmentation of 
the global market and from a shortage of supplies 
because of national production quotas.3
3 Cf. OECD: Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries, Monitoring and Eva-
Price-fixing in the global agricultural markets is 
strongly influenced by the policy measures taken by 
individual trading partners: in developing countries 
prices were too low to provide additional production 
incentives for the local farmers, while for years and 
years they have been too high in the industrial coun-
tries. This has placed a burden on consumers and 
tax payers and delayed the unavoidable structural 
adjustments necessary in the agricultural sectors. 
Correspondingly, the global market has become a 
shrunken “surplus market“ in which, for example, 
fluctuations in supply caused by the weather have 
a considerably harsher effect than in free trade re-
gimes. Rising production costs caused by high ener-
gy prices or changes in consumer habits in emerging 
markets are also becoming particularly noticeable 
globally in international agricultural trade.
Current price increases
Global population growth and the emergence of a 
financially strong middle class in emerging coun-
tries such as China and India has created together 
with the demand for higher-value foods such as 
meat will necessitate in the long-term more agri-
cultural production for commodities such as corn, 
wheat or rice. The increasing use of these foods 
luation. Paris 2007.
Figure 1
Prices of internationally traded wheat and rice varieties
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as energy sources—especially if one considers the 
price rises in crude oil and natural gas—fuels the 
demand for agricultural commodities. Agricultural 
areas are consequently increasingly being used for 
the production of bioenergy products.4 Moreover 
urbanization increases the pressure on cultivable 
land, especially in the regions where it is scarce 
such as in China or Egypt since more and more 
agricultural land is being used for other purposes 
such as streets, housing and industry.
The long-term development   tendencies listed here 
certainly point to a shortage of supply but do not 
seem to completely explain the dramatic price rise 
in the first half of this year. Thus a comparison of 
the production and consumption of rice and wheat 
in the years 1986/87 to 2006/07 shows that yearly 
fluctuations in production due to climatic conditions 
are completely normal. It is also apparent that up 
to now fluctuations in consumption have been re-
latively quickly offset by corresponding adaptation 
of production (Figure 2).
Moreover, during the last two decades, food produc-
tion has been successfully expanded, especially in 
the developing countries including the least develo-
ped countries. At the same time the industrial coun-
tries have to a large extent stabilized their production 
at a level similar to that at the beginning of the 
1990s. With regard to existing production potential, 
it is interesting that a production slump in the de-
velopment countries in 1993 was more than offset 
by a rise in production in the industrial countries in 
the same year (Figure 3). However overall there has 
been a downward trend in productivity increases in 
the last few years.5
The most recent crop yield estimates for the current 
year from the FAO forecast a conspicuous rise in 
cereal production of 2.6 percent to a record level of 
2,164 million tons.6At the same time the increase 
in wheat production turns out to be conspicuously 
higher than that of other cereal varieties, with the 
result that the FAO expects the situation of the wheat 
market to normalize.7A similar development has 
recently been observed in the dairy market: the milk 
shortage on global markets in the last year has led 
to a price increase. This price incentive, together 
with the increase in milk quotas within the EU, has 
4 It remains to be seen if the optimistic scenarios presently being dis-
cussed materialize. For this cf. OECD: Biofuels: Linking Support to Perfor-
mance. Roundtable 138, OECD, Paris 2008.
5 Cf. Braun, J. von : Poverty, Climate Change, Rising Food Prices, and the 
Small Farmers. Presentation at the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (2008).
6 Similar predictions are currently being made for this year’s rice crops in 
Thailand, India and other important Asian rice producers.
7  FAO: Crop Prospects and Food Situation. No. 2, April 2008,1.
led to an expansion in production that has in turn 
caused a downward pressure on prices.
Caution is therefore advisable when interpreting the 
present price increases in agricultural commodities. 
Looking at the global production processes depicted, 
Figure 2
Consumption and production of wheat and rice  
according to crop years








































Source: US Department of Agriculture.   DIW Berlin 2008
Figure 3
Food production according to country groups
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one concludes that the recent extreme upward price 
movements are in part speculative exaggerations 
(Box 1).
Trade liberalization to safeguard an 
adequate food supply
Short-acting supporting measures by the internatio-
nal community, for example through food supplies 
or income transfer, are inevitable in view of the 
present price shocks.8In the mid- and long-term it 
is necessary to develop effective networks of social 
security and to enhance agricultural infrastructures 
such as agricultural-based research and technology 
in order to improve the supply situation. Secure 
property rights for producers, greater scope in policy 
making, and more efficient administration at a local 
level are also required. Increased efficiency in global 
agricultural production ultimately requires basic 
reforms in international agricultural policy.
For many years agricultural policy has played a 
major part in the negotiating rounds at the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). The central demand was 
always that industrial countries should give predo-
8 Cf. Braun, J. von: High Food Prices: The What, Who, and How of Propo-
sed Policy Actions. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
Policy Brief May 2008, Washington, D.C. 2008.
minantly agricultural development countries access 
to their markets by dropping their trade barriers and 
with it open up additional income opportunities. 
The completion of the Uruguay Round at the be-
ginning of the 1990s actually resulted in numerous 
reform   steps, especially in the European Union’s ag-
ricultural policy (CAP). Production subsidies were 
gradually replaced by direct income transfers to 
European farmers, that is the payments were “decou-
pled” from the production price. Many developing 
countries received unilateral trade preferences in 
selected agricultural markets, that is they can export 
to the EU at lower tariff rates. For example such 
preferences exist for sugar and bananas. However 
export subsidies and indirect measures taken by the 
industrial countries that aid the separation of natio-
nal markets continue to cause immense distortions 
in global agricultural markets.9 It is impossible to 
predict if the current Doha Round will result in fur-
ther liberalization. A conspicuous contrast to this is 
the Farm Bill (289 billion US dollars for five years) 
passed by the US Congress in May 200810 and with 
it an extension of US American subsidy policy for 
9 Cf. Braun, J. von, Gulati, A. ,Orden, D.: Theses on development-orien-
ted reforms of agricultural policy in the context of WTO negotiations 
from a global perspective. International Food Policy Research Institute, 
Washington D.C. 2006.
10 Cf. US Congress: Congress Passes Farm Bill. Press announcement by 
US Congress; and USDA: 2007 Farm Bill Proposals. United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture, Status 21. May 2008.
Box 1
Speculation in the agricultural markets
A large part of global agricultural trade is transacted 
via the commodities exchanges of Chicago (CME - Chi-
cago Mercantile Exchange) and New York (NIMEX - New 
York Mercantile Exchange).1 The futures trading car-
ried out in these exchanges is a safeguard instrument 
against price fluctuations. The producer profits from 
fixed selling prices just as much as the purchaser. The 
so-called hedging comes from the purchase or sale of 
future delivery commitments at a current market rate. 
Provided that futures markets serve to attenuate actual 
uncertainties that arise from exogenous risks they do 
not fundamentally pose any risk potential to the sta-
bility of agricultural markets. In fact trade in futures 
contracts is an important means of stabilizing commo-
dity markets.
However the position changes when investors in com-
modity futures, the so-called “noise traders”,2 want to 
achieve short-term gains through uncontrolled price 
fluctuations. They only enter the market in order to use 
their financial power to drive it in a direction they have 
determined in advance.3 This can have an extremely 
detrimental effect on normal market activities. The lite-
rature of economic theory shows that this produces price 
trends based on behavior anomalies that correspond to a 
speculation bubble. So if powerful market traders enter 
the commodity futures markets with the strategic goal 
of setting a price trend and aligning their contracts to 
this trend, then rising market prices can no longer be 
interpreted as a shortage signal. The consequence can 
be that a speculative bubble forms which then collapses 
when the trader withdraws after a short time. It is very 
difficult to recognize such market manipulations and to 
identify their perpetrators at an early stage.
1 Both exchanges merged this March when the NYMEX was taken 
over by the CME-Group.
2 Dow, J., Gorton, G.: Noise traders. In: Durlauf, S. N., Blume, L. E. 
(Hrsg.): The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics. 2nd Edition, 
Upcoming.
3 Capuano, C.: Strategic Noise traders and Liquidity Pressure with a 
Physically Deliverable Futures Contract. International Review of Eco-
nomics & Finance, Volume 15, Issue 1, 2006,1-14; Johnson, J., Tellis, 
G.J.: Blowing Bubbles: Heuristics and Biases in the Run-Up of Stock 
Prices. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science,33 (2005), 486-
503.Causes and consequences of rising food prices
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a further five years. In addition, increasing state 
promotion of bioenergy has led to renewed market 
distortions.
There is broad agreement that liberalization will 
increase the efficiency of global agricultural mar-
kets.11 It is however arguable whether this will ac-
tually benefit those countries that are hardest hit 
by the current rise in food prices. There are three 
important factors in this:
the net trade position, •	
existing trade preferences •	 12 such as
vertical structures of the agricultural  •	
value chain.
Net trade position 
A reduction in agricultural protection in industri-
al countries reduces production incentives for the 
producers in those countries and offers consumers 
better access to the global market. For these rea-
sons further liberalization will probably cause global 
market prices to rise (Figure 4). As far as products 
that are also produced in the poorest countries are 
concerned, this will result in additional revenues for 
those countries, e. g. in cotton or oilseeds. These 
revenues could be used to purchase staple foods such 
as rice and other cereal crops for which most of the 
predominantly agricultural development countries 
are net importers. It is anticipated that there will be 
positive combined effects from liberalization in the 
cereal importing countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Mali, Chad and Sudan for example, which at the 
same time obtain an important part of their export 
revenues from cotton or oilseeds. However the si-
tuation is different in countries such as Burundi, 
Kenya, Niger or Ruanda which possess few such 
advantages in the agricultural sector and are reliant 
on investments that increase productivity to produce 
staple foods.13 It should nevertheless be born in 
mind that state-controlled prices for basic foods 
in developing countries provide local producers 
with few incentives for such rises in productivity. 
Cautious liberalization of national markets could 
eliminate these distortions if accompanied by social 
security measures.
11 Modell based estimates assume that continuation of the present ta-
riff and subsidy policies in the agricultural sector to 2015 will incur an-
nual costs of 100 to 300 billion US dollars per year. World Bank: World 
Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development. Washington 
D.C. 2008,103.
12  Cf.  l.  Tangermann,  S.:  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation 
and  Development  Area  Agricultural  Policies  and  the  Interests  of 
Developing Countries. American Journal of Agricultural Economics,87, 
2005,1128-1144; Anderson, K., Martin, W. (Hrsg.): Agricultural Trade 
Reform & the Doha Development Agenda. Washington D.C. 2006.
13 World Bank, l.c.., 106 f.
Trade preferences
If the actual tariff rates of industrial countries could 
be lowered, this would bring relative disadvantage to 
those countries that have up to now benefited from 
trade preferences. This “preference erosion” reduces 
the advantage that favored developing countries 
should have been able to benefit indirectly from the 
agricultural protection of industrial countries. How 
far preferences really carry any weight depends in 
each case on the realized profit margin and this dif-
fers sharply from product to product. According to 
a IWF study, 42 percent of the revenues from trade 
preferences for exports to the EU, Japan, Canada, 
and the United States came from sugar and 19 per-
cent from bananas.14
Vertical structures
The extent to which trade liberalization has had a 
positive effect depends ultimately on the structure of 
the value chain. Producers seldom sell agricultural 
commodities directly to final consumers. Instead 
they are bought up by traders or the manufacturing 
industry and pass through a transformation process 
before they eventually reach the final consumer 
via the retail trade. Because of the relative strong 
homogeneity of agricultural products and the large 
14 Alexandraki, K., Lankes, H. P.:The Impact of Preference Erosion on 
Middle-Income Developing Countries. IMF Working Paper WP/04/169. 
Washington D.C., 2004.
Figure 4
Real price rises in agricultural markets 
through global free trade
In percentages 





















Source: Anderson, K., Martin, W., van der Mensbrugghe, D.:  
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number of buyers and sellers, it was assumed for a 
long time that perfect competition existed at each 
individual stage of the agricultural value chain. The 
structure of these markets has meanwhile changed 
considerably. Strong concentrati  on processes can 
be observed on the part of both upstream suppliers 
(fertilizer, pest management and seeds) and down-
stream wholesalers or traders.15 Correspondingly, 
market performance is often influenced by strategic 
behavior at the expense of the primary producers.
It can be seen that exporters from developing coun-
tries benefit relatively less from liberalized markets 
when they encounter oligopolistic vertical struc-
tures in industrial countries. This is because a high 
concentration on the demand side weakens their 
bargaining position.16 This in turn has a negative 
effect on producer prices and so reduces the benefits 
to be gained from trade liberalization. Overall it 
can be shown that the development of such modern 
value chains has increased the revenue of producers 
in some countries by 10 to 100 percent. During the 
interna  tionalization of the agricultural value chain 
care should also be taken to ensure that standards of 
food safety and quality are not misused as new or 
supplementary (non-tariff) trade barriers to protect 
na  tional markets from imports.17
Production incentives through organization 
of the value chain
In large parts of Africa, Asia and South Ame  rica 
the production of exports such as coffee, tea, cocoa 
and cotton was state controlled up to the 1990s. 
State or half-state companies organized trade and 
export as well as the purchase of the means of pro-
duction. This certainly overcame inefficiencies in 
input-markets and capital access. However the mo-
nopoly power of companies caused purchase prices 
and producer prices to drop and eventually led to 
decreased production.18 In 1980 the World Bank 
then called for the liberalization of state marketing 
with the aim of making the producers better off. 
If producers have more alternatives for the sale or 
export of their goods, they are less dependent on in-
dividual (wholesale) buyers and have less poten  tial 
market power. Increasing competition in Asia and 
Africa following the liberalization of state buyers’ 
monopolies consequently led to a rise in producer 
15 Around 90 percent of the global cereal trade ls controlled by three 
companies (Cargill, ADM and Bunge). An increasing concentration in re-
tail can be observed globally.
16  Cf. Sexton, R., Sheldon, I., McCorriston, S., Wang, H. (2007): Agri-
cultural Trade Liberalization and Economic Development: The Role of 
Downstream Market Power. Agricultural Economics, 36, 253-270.
17 Cf. Braun, J. et al., a.a.O.
18 Many studies point out shortfalls and ineffective state controlled va-
lue chains, cf. Swinnen,J. F. M., Rozelle, S.: From Marx and Mao to the Mar-
ket. The Economicsand Politicsof Agricultural Transition, Oxford 2006.
prices.19 The example of cocoa market liberalization 
in Nigeria and the Ivory Coast confirmed this.20 
While liberalization in Nigeria brought about a very 
competitive structure in which multinational and 
national export firms co-existed, there was a strong 
concentration of the export market on the Ivory 
Coast. Meanwhile the five largest exporting tra-
ding concerns in the market—usually multinational 
companies—account for around 50 percent of the 
exports. According to estimates, stronger concentra-
tion of the cocoa market on the Ivory Coast favors 
the exercise of market power. Producer prices in 
Nigeria at 1,072 US dollars per ton are consequently 
higher than on the Ivory Coast which has 687 US 
dollars per ton.
However competition on the demand side can also 
have a negative effect by reducing the stability of 
credit programs for purchasing means of production. 
This is illustrated in the example of the Zambian 
cotton sector (Box 2).
Conclusion
Recently the drastic price increases in food in many 
countries have triggered a food crisis. At the present 
time it is not absolutely certain if present price rises 
in agricultural markets are merely an expression 
of relative shortages or also of speculative exag-
gerations. Speculative price eruptions should be 
checked by improved transparency in the futures 
markets. Population growth, the change in eating 
habits, increasing urbanization, and the increasing 
use of plants to extract bioenergy point however to 
the fact that there will be increasing supply shortfalls 
in the long run. This requires rises in productivity 
and expansion of cultivable land to counteract these 
developments. Long-term deployment of improved 
cultivation technology is therefore needed in addi-
tion to short-term supporting measures. This goal 
will not be achieved without investment in agricu-
ltural research and agricultural infrastructures. In 
particular smallholder production in the developing 
countries should be encouraged.
In addition trade barriers should be abolished, to 
reduce short-term price fluctuations and to increase 
production incentives for food producers globally. 
Especially vulnerable countries whose net imports 
are staple foods should be assisted through transfer   
payments and investment in local agriculture. Ho-
wever rises in productivity and ultimately higher 
19 Swinnen, J. F. M., Vandeplas, A.:Contracting,Competition and Rent 
Distribution in Commodity Value Chains. In: Governance, coordination 
and distribution along commodity value chains, FAO Commodities and 
Trade proceedings, 2006.
20 Wilcox, M. D., Abbot, P.C.: Market Power and Structural Adjustment: 
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production incentives for agricultural producers require operational capability in 
the markets along the value chain to safeguard competition. Consequently manuf-
acturers of the means of production (fertilizer, seeds etc.) and wholesalers must be 
prevented from abusing their existing market power over the agricultural producers 
through international regulatory authorities.
Box 2
The Zambian cotton sector
Until 1994 both the means of production 
and the selling-on of cotton was controlled 
by a state company. Although there was 
some market entry by private firms du-
ring the course of market liberalization, 
regional monopolies developed, with the 
result that at first there was no competiti-
on. Individual buyers offered to supply the 
producers with the means of production on 
a credit basis. This led to a considerable 
increase in cotton pro duction. The increa-
sing attractiveness of the Zambian cotton 
market resulted in further market entry 
and led to increasing competition amongst 
the wholesale buyers for the raw material, 
cotton. Some firms which had no advance 
financing programs, offered higher prices, 
so some producers switched over to these 
market newcomers despite the fact that 
they had already entered contracts and 
had locked-up credit. The consequence 
was an increase in loan defaults. The high 
loss rate led in turn to higher credit prices. 
This, together with a fall in producer prices 
due to lower global market prices, destro-
yed the trust between producers and bu-
yers. The market collapsed. In this case the 
opportunistic behavior of the producers 
benefited from the increasing number of 
consumers and this ultimately led to the 
market failure that has been described.1
1 Brambilla, I., Porto, G.: MarketStructure, Outgrower 
Contracts and Farm Output. Evidence From Cotton 
Reforms in Zambia. Mimeo 2007.